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ABSTRACT
Bridge inspection has a pivotal role in assuring the safety of critical structures constituting
society. However, high cost, worker safety, and low objectivity of quality are classic problems in
traditional visual inspection. Recent trends in bridge inspection have led to a proliferation of
research utilizing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). This thesis proposes a Trusted Platform
for Bridge Inspection Management System (Trusted-BIMS) for safe and efficient bridge
inspection by proving the UAV-based inspection process and improving the prototype of the
previous study. Designed based on a Zero-Trust (ZT) strategy, Trusted-BIMS consist of (1) a
database-driven web framework with security features for bridge inspection management, (2) a
mobile interface supporting the inspection data collection using UAVs, and (3) a mutual
authentication protocol for the Internet of Things (IoTs). The server script language used to
implement the web system was PHP and React Native was used for the mobile application
development. The secure communication algorithm used server-side PHP and client-side
JavaScript, and MySQL was adopted as the database. This paper provides an overview and
details of Trusted-BIMS and demonstrates the overall process of bridge inspection using UAVs
and applied technologies to the proposed platform. The result of this research will make an
important contribution to the field of UAV-based bridge inspection. Further research can be
conducted on refined implementations of security algorithms, more comprehensive security
schemes, and machine learning technology to reduce human intervention.

Keywords: unmanned aerial vehicle; bridge inspection; software development; cybersecurity;
zero-trust; mutual authentication
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
Bridges are one of the most important infrastructures in contemporary civilization and
bridge inspections are vital components in guaranteeing the safety of the key architectures
constituting society. Biennial bridge safety inspections are mandated by law to increase safety as
well as the longevity of these vital infrastructure components. Although the mandated
inspections must be conducted by state-certified inspectors who are required to fill out inspection
forms, creating a database of bridges and setting priorities are not required by law. The
traditional visual inspection has accessibility limitations, high cost, and safety risks. To solve
these issues, some states have begun to explore the use of rapidly growing UAV technology,
resulting in cost savings of three-fifths over manual inspection (Lovelace & Wells, 2018b;
Lovelace & Zink, 2015; Zink, 2016). Some capstone project teams at Marshall University
recently created a prototype of the interactive Bridge Inspection Research using Drone (iBIRD)
as proof of the concept (Song et al., 2022).
In an attempt to further develop the prototype, this research project is to implement an
intuitive web framework used for bridge inspections with secure communication among UAV,
Cloud, and computer devices and to improve the quality of the mobile application. The system
consists of (1) a database-driven web application of the Bridge Inspection Management tool, (2)
a mobile application gathering inspection data from UAV, and (3) an application of a lightweight
authentication system designed for the IoT devices used in the bridge inspection process.
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1.2 Problem Statement
Bridge inspection is important, but the mandated inspections conducted by state-certified
inspectors can be expensive and have several issues. It is necessary to control traffic during
inspections and to use a variety of equipment to check the bridge components, including underbridge inspection vehicles and lifts. It is these factors that increase the costs of inspection.
Besides, the issues related to costs frequently delay periodic close-up inspections of bridges in
some large cities (Lovelace & Wells, 2018b). There are over 7,314 bridges in West Virginia
alone (U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, 2021) and the
United States allocates approximately $15.6 billion per year for the maintenance of the
infrastructure (Kirk & Mallett, 2018). Most inspections are conducted visually by state-licensed
inspectors. Whereas a small-sized bridge may only need an inspector using a small ladder, other
larger bridges that require more detailed under-bridge inspections may require a truck unit with a
bucket attachment so the inspector can be lowered under the bridge for a detailed investigation
(Leonard, 2015). Bridge inspection teams first visually inspect a bridge looking for signs of rust
and weakened joints, and they examine the supports holding up the bridge. If the visual
examinations indicate a problem, more detailed inspections are conducted, which include the use
of an X-ray device that examines for hidden cracks or fatigue (Madden, 1983). Most bridges are,
therefore, only visually inspected but the current visual inspection process still suffers from high
costs and operator safety issues. These issues can be traced to the underlying problems arising
from manual inspections.
First, one such issue is the high expenditure of the federal, state, and local transportation
agencies on annual bridge inspections. With the aging of bridges, the number of structures
requiring bridge maintenance work increases. This is one of the reasons that the inspection
2

cycles are shortened. As a result, it is predicted that higher costs will be required, including
budget allocations for work time and worker training.
Second, visual inspections are conducted in such a way that the operator directly observes
the bridge. Since bridges are usually installed at high altitudes from the ground, there is a risk of
falling, and inspections are limited to locations that are inaccessible to humans. Inspections are
also greatly affected by the skill level of the operator.
Third, according to the background research conducted, there are limited studies related
to systems that display and manage bridge inspection data in a meaningful way. Although data
are collected annually for reporting purposes, suitable web applications that can keep track of the
data have not yet been developed. For such an application to be implemented, besides a wellstructured database that plays an important role in its implementation, proper classification and
storage of data are essential. In addition, various skill levels of the operator that affect the quality
of the inspection further necessitate the development of a platform that can share and integrate
information between working parties.
Fourth, with the use of UAVs, the protection, transmission, and storage of the data
acquired during the inspection process is a notable issue. According to the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), bridges are one of the critical infrastructures in society,
and the disabling or destruction of these infrastructures is considerable implications for national
security, the economy, and public health (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
CISA, 2020). Inspections make it possible to identify and check the weaknesses of bridges, and
this information has the potential to be used or might be used by malicious attackers to disable or
destruct critical architectures. It means that sensitive data is handled throughout the entire
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process of the inspections. Data captured by unauthorized users can be a threat to the
infrastructure.
Based on the issues identified above through research, the following two ideas are
suggested to be considered at the level of the State Department of Transportation to solve
problems arising from manual inspections:
1) a new method of inspection that can replace the traditional inspection method and
2) a safe framework to effectively display and manage inspection data.

1.3 Objectives
The objectives of this research project are to design and implement a Trusted Platform for
Bridge Inspection Management System (Trusted-BIMS) to conduct safe and cost-effective
bridge inspection using UAVs and to provide a secure streamlined bridge inspection and
reporting process. The system will consist of (1) a database-driven Bridge Inspection
Management web application with security features; (2) a mobile app gathering inspection data
from UAV; and (3) a secure communication protocol for the IoT. Moreover, this study will
provide a provision of user-friendly web applications with not only data drill-down functions but
also security features, introducing zero-trust architectures to establish a trusted platform.

1.4 Contributions
This research has the following contributions:
1) Presenting a comprehensive review of the UAV-assisted bridge inspection process.
2) Developing and demonstrating an intuitive web framework and mobile application for
bridge inspection.
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3) Reviewing the security vulnerabilities of IoT devices used for bridge inspection and
proposing an appropriate security scheme.
The results of this study will be of value to federal, state, and local transportation agencies and
industry practitioners conducting bridge inspections.

1.5 Organization
The primary methods of conducting this research are web framework development, crossplatform mobile application implementation, and security schema modeling for IoT devices. To
investigate the effectiveness of UAV-based bridge inspection compared to manual bridge
inspection, academic research on industrial practices and implementation methods of bridge
inspection using UAVs was performed for the first step. Chapter 2 includes literary reviews of
traditional manual bridge inspections, UAV-based bridge inspections, UAV regulations, and
cybersecurity issues related to platforms and entities for bridge inspection. In this study, how
drone technology can be applied to bridge inspections will be researched, and related studies of
other State Departments of Transportation will be reviewed. As a basis for implementing a
trusted platform, this study will also be conducted on potential vulnerabilities that may arise
from the use of UAVs, and on secure communication protocols, especially lightweight protocols.
Based on the basic research, a web platform and a mobile application for UAV-based
bridge inspection are implemented. For secure communication, a Physical Unclonable Function
(PUF)-based authentication algorithm is applied to the system and simulated. Chapter 3 presents
the overview of the proposed schema consisting of these three modules, Trusted-BIMS. This
chapter includes descriptions of each module as well as the overall UAV-based bridge inspection
process. Chapter 4 details the design of Trusted-BIMS. In this chapter, a specification of each
system is provided. The major functions implemented in each module and submodule are also
5

described with figures. In Chapter 5, the security and threats to the proposed schema are
analyzed based on the ZT model. Chapter 6 describes the findings and significance of this
research. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a conclusion and future research. This
thesis explains the overall framework of research on a trusted platform with built-in security
features for UAV-assisted bridge inspections based on a comprehensive review and
understanding.

6

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Manual Bridge Inspection
Manual bridge inspection is a method in which inspectors directly go to the site and
visually inspect the bridge. Because of this characteristic, it is called visual bridge inspection.
West Virginia is taking this approach, therefore, in this thesis, this method is also referred to as
traditional bridge inspection.
The literature review shows that there are several issues with manual inspections. This
traditional visual method has accessibility limitations, high cost, and worker safety risks. First,
visual inspections are usually expensive compared to other methods. The experience and
knowledge of the officials play a significant role in the manual inspection. It is also necessary to
control traffic during inspections and to use a variety of equipment to check the bridge
components, including under-bridge inspection vehicles and lifts. It is these factors that increase
the costs of inspection. The Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT)’s estimate that
traditional inspections cost about 3.8 times more than drone inspections supports this fact (The
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), 2019).
Besides, in some large cities, cost issues frequently cause delays in routine close-up bridge
inspections (Lovelace & Wells, 2018b). Second, safety is one of the major issues. The safety of
the officials and the traveling public continues to be jeopardized by visual inspections. This
method often requires work in areas that are difficult to access by humans. There is also a risk of
failure of access equipment. Lane closures are a significant contributor to the risk of injury and
death (Lovelace & Wells, 2018b). Third, the collection method of manual inspection limits the
effective management of data. In the traditional way, officials directly sketch, photograph the
bridge, or hand-write relevant content at the collection site (Leshko, 2015). Digital devices are
7

then used to create electronic documents. Depending on the skill of the inspector, there might be
significant differences in the result of inspections because they are prone to subjective
evaluations and assessments. It means that critical defects in the bridge may not be uncovered for
a long time depending on the inspectors due to no platform to guide the inspectors and share data
between working parties. In response to these problems, the need for effective data management
and improvement of reporting process has emerged. However, there currently is limited research
on tools that can adequately manage inspection data and reports. To my knowledge, there is no
notable solution that can manage longitudinal data, and the software distributed to the relevant
officials has some discrepancies from the actual inspection report content. Although some
Departments of Transportation conduct research using 3-dimensional models, they use software
dedicated to mapping (Lovelace & Wells, 2018a) and are not integrated with the report creation
process. Monitoring bridge conditions to apply timely preservation activities to keep “good
bridges good” and prevent more bridges from being classified as deficient is a goal every
municipality should embrace. However, limited progress has been made in managing data
collected by inspection to provide cost-effective decision-making (Leonard, 2015) but no
comprehensive reporting system exists.
From a security point of view, confidentiality related to the disclosure of bridge
inspection reports is one of the most frequently stated issues with traditional bridge inspections.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is concerned about the disclosure of information
on critical infrastructure, arguing that exposure to vulnerabilities in such infrastructure could be a
potential threat utilized for attack by malicious users (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
2009). For this reason, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) treats the
bridge inspection information as confidential and does not disclose it to the public (Pennsylvania
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Department of Transportation, 2021). This suggests the need for limited access control by
restricting access to the full due diligence report. Moreover, in the case of disclosing some
transportation maintenance activity data for the public’s right to know, suitable data
classification regulations are required, such as excluding sensitive information that can
incapacitate infrastructure. Several West Virginia bridge inspection reports are accessible
through a web search engine, Google. This means anyone can download the data. To ensure
confidentiality and adequate access control, a new platform that provides access only to
authorized entities is required.
Maintaining integrity has been the subject of considerable discussion. Traditional bridge
inspections perform the process of converting field investigation data into digital reports. In other
words, the contents of the notes made on-site are converted into digital form by inspectors. In
this process, time gaps and spatial differences arise. This can make it difficult to tightly control
entities and resources to maintain integrity. Data may be changed in the process of converting
handwriting, and this may reduce the accuracy of the data. It is also difficult to prove that only
authorized users have access to the resource. The characteristic of this process is also closely
related to the availability of data. If the note or camera recording the inspection is lost, the data is
also lost and cannot be recovered. This raises the need for a framework that can directly transmit
data from the field to remote locations.
According to literature analysis of manual bridge inspection, the research to date has
tended to focus on the inspection process itself rather than security. This, therefore, indicates that
research on a platform and process that can resolve the security issues of the traditional method
while presenting a new cost-effective schema needs to be conducted.
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2.2 UAV-based Bridge Inspection
Bridge inspection using UAVs has been proposed to replace the traditional inspection
method. UAV-based bridge inspection refers to the use of UAVs in the bridge inspection
process. In other words, instead of inspectors directly approaching the bridge and taking pictures,
the UAV carries out this work. In the United States, some states explore the use of rapidly
growing UAV technology as summarized in Table 1.
Applied or tested UAVs for bridge inspection
Researching the potential use of UAVs
Alabama
Minnesota
Alaska
Florida
California
Idaho
Colorado
Iowa
Connecticut
Kansas
Georgia
Louisiana
Kentucky
Michigan
Maine
New York
Nevada
South Carolina
New Jersey
South Dakota
North Carolina
Vermont
Ohio
Wisconsin
Oregon
Utah
Table 1: List of states that have applied or are researching bridge inspection using UAVs
Fourteen states, including California, have introduced UAV-based bridge inspection, and 12
states, including Minnesota, are actively researching the potential use of UAVs (The Western
Transportation Knowledge Network (WTKN), 2018; United States Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2022; Seo et al., 2018; Georgia Department
of Transportation, 2019; ROAD&BRIDGES, 2016; ROADS&BRIDGES, 2020;
ROAD&BRIDGES, 2021; Burgett et al., 2019; NJDOT Bureau of Research, 2022; Federal
Highway Administration, 2021). The Minnesota Department of Transportation has completed a
third phase of research focused on utilizing drones as a tool to improve the quality of bridge
10

inspections in 2019, reported an average cost saving of 40%, and showed a dramatic reduction in
risks for the public and transportation workers (Lovelace & Wells, 2018b).

2.3 UAV Regulations
To protect civil privacy and maintain social order, the use of UAVs is regulated by law.
This means there are legal limits on the use of UAVs for bridge inspection. According to the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), drones used for commercial purposes must meet the
requirements of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 107 (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2021b). The regulation includes the requirement that FAA certification of UAV
pilots through testing is required, as well as the provision to register drones every three years.
State officials should operate UAVs under Part 107 rules or should obtain an FAA certificate of
authorization (COA) (Federal Aviation Administration, 2021e). The use of drones for research
purposes is governed by the Recreational Flyers Rule by 49 USC 44809 and Public Law 115-254
Section 305 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2021c). In this case, UAV registration is not
required if the Aircraft weighs less than 250g (Federal Aviation Administration, 2021d), but a
certificate of passing The Recreational UAS Safety Test (TRUST) is required (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2022). The flight area also is limited due to safety issues. The FAA classifies
airspace into A-E and G classes in consideration of the surrounding infrastructure, and flight
conditions vary according to these classes. Figure 1 shows the flight regulation by class (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2021a).
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Figure 1. Flight Regulation by Class (Federal Aviation Administration, 2021a)
Flights are generally permitted within Class G airspaces, and flight altitudes are limited to within
400 feet from structures. Other classes of airspace require additional FAA permits to fly UAVs.
Therefore, pilots should check the class and regulations of the area before flying the drone.
Figure 2 shows airspace regulations in West Virginia and around the area (Aloft, n.d.).

Figure 2. Airspace Regulations in West Virginia (Aloft, n.d.)
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2.4 Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity Basics
Developing a trusted platform requires a certain level of cybersecurity. According to the
Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS, 2015), cybersecurity is a comprehensive
concept that refers to the protection and defense of systems to ensure five characteristics:
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and non-repudiation.
Confidentiality is the disclosure of information only to authorized users (CNSS, 2015).
The word ‘user’ in this context means every entity, including individuals, software, and hardware
(United States Naval Academy, n.d.). Confidentiality is important to ensure personal privacy and
to prevent sensitive information such as personal information and business ideas from being
stolen or misused. This property can be ensured by restricting users’ authority and access,
encrypting data, etc.
Integrity is that information is not altered in an unauthorized way (Ross et al., 2016). This
is a principle that should be followed to ensure the consistency of information, the accuracy of
resources, and the completeness of data (United States Naval Academy, n.d.). In other words,
maintaining integrity is an important factor in increasing the reliability of the system. This can be
realized through the validation of data or files using hash functions.
Availability allows authorized users to have reliable access to information and systems
(CNSS, 2015). Providing timely data is one of the fundamental reasons information systems
exist. Availability can be ensured by devising countermeasures to prevent, protect, and respond
to physical threats such as theft and loss of physical medium and attack defense that disable the
system by controlling access to the system.
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Authentication is the verification of the eligibility of an entity, which may be required in
a variety of situations, including user access to the system, and sending messages (CNSS, 2015).
This is essential to secure systems and build a reliable platform. If authentication is not
performed, information may be leaked or used with malicious intent by unauthorized entities,
and the system may be altered or destroyed. Authentication can be provided through the
introduction of a secure authentication algorithm.
Non-repudiation means protecting against denying certain activities (National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2020). Examples of such actions are information system access or
data processing. This property improves the reliability of information and systems and helps
maintain their integrity. If Non-repudiation is not guaranteed, there is a possibility of
undermining the user’s accountability. To ensure this property, user activity logs may be
recorded and archived, and a method of identifying the user using a digital signature can be
applied to the system.
Cybersecurity on UAV-based bridge inspection
Although bridge inspection using UAVs provide multiple benefits, it will expose the
system to several cybersecurity challenges, like any other communication device.
Representatively, there are man-in-the-middle attacks, which manipulate network
communication to eavesdrop or manipulate communication contents, and Known Session Key
attacks, which use outdated session keys to gain unauthorized access. Stolen smart device
attacks, which physically steal the device, are also major issues. Using the diverse attack
methods, attackers can steal the UAV and IoT device controlling the UAV or the information the
IoT has.
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Due to the vulnerabilities, CISA has proposed to encrypt both stored and in-transit data in
operations with UAVs to ensure confidentiality and integrity (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency CISA, 2019). To provide secure data transmission between UAV and IoT
devices and clouds, considerable research has been conducted. UAVs and IoT devices are
limited in power, process, and memory. These features make it difficult to apply traditional
cryptographic protocols. Most of the research in the field of portable device security systems,
therefore, focuses on lightweight encryption system approaches.
One example is the design of a lightweight authentication system between entities
involving UAVs. Some studies used encryption based on user identity (Zhang et al., 2020). The
control server grants an identity-based private key to the UAV and users during the preregistration process. Using the given private key, the drone and the users perform mutual
authentication and access the server. In this authentication method, the process of obtaining the
private key in advance must be preceded, and it is not suitable for real-time applications.
Another study presented a digital signature-based lightweight protocol between UAV and
ground station, which was effective in defending against man-in-the-middle attacks and showed
better performance in terms of cost, such as energy consumption and computation time (Li & Pu,
2020). In a similar study, a protocol for securely collecting and storing data through mutual
authentication between two entities was presented, and it was demonstrated that communication
overhead and computational cost were low and that the proposed mechanism provided better
security (Pu et al., 2022).
In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature on authentication
systems based on physical clone protection was studied. The PUF-based mutual authentication
method generates encrypted messages using the identity of the IoT device and the unique

15

physical fingerprint of the machine (Aman et al., 2017). Because a new set of challenges and
responses are created each time authentication is performed, even if an attacker obtains the
session key, the password set by the server cannot be inferred. In another major study, the
lightweight protocol for mutual authentication between UAV and ground station, which
introduced the PUF concept, showed better performance in computational cost and
communication overhead compared to the existing encryption technology (Pu & Li, 2020). This
concept has proven that it can respond well to widely known security attacks (Pu et al., 2022).
Based on this review, PUF-based authentication will be simulated as a security function
to provide secure transmission of inspection data from an IoT device to an inspector’s computer
device and a cloud, ensuring security and countermeasures for potential vulnerabilities in IoT
devices used throughout the proposed inspection process.
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CHAPTER 3: OVERVIEW OF TRUSTED-BIMS
Trusted-BIMS is designed to support bridge inspection using UAVs. This schema is
involved in all inspection phases such as assigning work, conducting site inspections, generating
reports, and analyzing inspection data. Figure 3 shows the high-level system diagram of the
proposed system.

Figure 3. The Proposed High-Level Diagram of the Framework

This system consists of (1) a secure database-driven web application of the Bridge Inspection
Management tool, (2) a mobile app gathering inspection data from UAV, and (3) an application
of a lightweight authentication system designed for IoT devices used in the bridge inspection
process. The overall framework of UAV-based bridge inspection research with built-in security
features is described based on a comprehensive review and understanding.
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3.1 Reporting Module
The reporting module uses the data collected by the UAV to describe the overall process
for the inspector to create bridge inspection reports via a web application. As part of this module,
a bridge inspection management system will be developed using PHP. The web system includes
four main features: Inspection Management, Inspector Management, Bridge Management, and
Report Management.
The entities that make up the reporting module are inspectors, administrators,
supervisors, client devices, and data servers. Among them, the human entity is closely related to
the role of the worker, and they access the web application using the client device, like a desktop.
In this module, the web framework is implemented based on communication between the client
device and the database server and provides functions necessary for the human entity’s bridge
inspection process.
Inspectors utilize the program to create inspection reports based on the data collected.
The inspection management submodule supports the entire process from inspection assignment
to generating inspection reports. Administrators assign inspections to workers, review the created
inspection reports, add users with inspector privileges to the system, and manage overall
information about the bridge, including bridge elements. The web application supports these
tasks by providing inspection, inspector, and bridge management submodules. Supervisors
require data analysis on the state-wide bridge inspection status by year and the risk of bridges.
The report management submodule provides the drill-down functions for analysis. The client
device provides an interface to human entities and acts as a bridge to connect with the database
server. The data server stores the data used in the whole bridge inspection process and provides
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the data users need. In this way, the entities constituting the reporting module are organically
connected.
By utilizing the reporting module developed on this platform, the overall bridge
inspection can be managed, from the inspection assignments to report generating. This module
makes a major contribution to research on UAV-based bridge inspection by demonstrating the
process of utilizing 3D models of a bridge created using a UAV in the writing reports. Officials
can intuitively understand the bridge state through this 3D model. In addition, this module
supports easy report creation by making the data collected by inspectors accessible from the web
interface. Besides, it is meaningful in that it not only displays and manages the bridge inspection
data collected annually in a meaningful way but also archives it so that the data can be traced
over a long period of time. The implementation of this module provides a platform to share
information between different stakeholders.

3.2 Data Collection Module
The data collection module covers the process by which inspectors use IoT devices and
UAVs to obtain information about bridges and bridge elements. It also includes simple APIs for
transmitting data directly from an IoT device to a remote database. The entities that make up the
data collection module are inspectors, UAVs, IoT devices, and a data server. Inspectors
communicate with the UAV via an IoT device and send the collected data to a server via a
mobile application. UAVs take pictures of bridges and are used to collect fundamental data for
3D models, GPS information, inspection data, etc. IoT devices provide the inspector with an
interface to use the mobile unit and temporarily store the information collected from the UAV. A
data server stores the information transmitted from the IoT device and provides the data to be
used for inspection reports in the web framework.
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The data collection module allows inspectors for rapid collection and ensures the
inspection data is available as soon as possible. In addition, this module provides the function to
send the collected data from the field to the data center, preventing data loss due to physical
threats such as loss of inspection notes.

3.3 Secure Communication Module
A secure communication module is closely related to the data collection module. This
security module is for the user and device authentication when sending the data collected and
organized by the inspector to the server. In detail, a secure schema and mobile application are
designed for secure data exchange between IoT devices and the cloud server. The entities that
make up this security module are IoT devices and a server. These two entities have a form of
two-way communication that sends and receives encrypted messages and codes that authenticate
the messages, using the fingerprint of the IoT device. Each entity performs mutual authentication
by verifying exchanged information using the unclonable unique value of the IoT device.
The secure communication module authenticates users and devices, making it difficult for
unauthorized entities to alter the contents of the data server. This authentication feature ensures
that data integrity is maintained, but also guarantees the reliability of the data transmitted by the
authenticated device. It is, therefore, designed to prevent unauthorized database access and
attacks using garbage data insertion. It also protects the server from being compromised by
unauthorized users.
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CHAPTER 4: SYSTEM DESIGN
Before describing the implementation, the bridge information and all of the inspection
data presented in this thesis are mock data created for demonstration purposes only, and it is not
actual data. All figures do not reflect real inspection and the data used in this paper do not imply
that actual bridges are dangerous.

4.1 Web Framework
To provide bridge inspections using UAVs, a web application that interacts with the
objects was developed. This application uses PHP as a server-side scripting language and has
been tested using MAMP and XAMPP, a local server environment. It also has been tested using
HostGator, a remote hosting server. This system uses a MySQL database to store data. MariaDB
server was used as the database management system. The proposed web schema uses stored
procedures to provide better security by avoiding displaying the SQL in plaintext on the clientside. More detailed information on the applied stored procedures can be found in Appendix C.
Figure 4 shows the data flow of the implemented web system.

Figure. 4. Data Flow Diagram
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Bridge Management
Bridge management enables integrated management of the overall information of
bridges. Figure 5 shows the main page of the bridge management. Using this, administrators can
add, remove, and update bridge data. This data includes basic information such as bridge name,
location, and built year, as well as bridge numbers and Bridge Analysis and Rating Systems
(BARS) numbers required for administrative management. Furthermore, a 3D model of the
bridges with the marked important bridge components to examine is included. Notably, this
modeling data help inspectors decide which elements of the bridge need to be inspected.

Figure 5. Bridge Management on the administrator’s side
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Figure 6. A 3D model with marked bridge elements

As shown in Figure 6, bridge elements and their details are included in the 3D model.
Administrators can manage bridge elements that require inspection. Those elements are
displayed as gray dots in the model. After conducting on-site inspections, inspectors can rate the
risk on a scale of 1 to 9 for each bridge element. Depending on the rate, the elements at each
inspection can be marked in different colors. This feature provides visual identification of the
elements that require further actions. It also gives a detailed picture of the condition of the target
bridge.
Inspection Management
Inspection Management plays an important role in the entire inspection process,
including assignment and execution of inspections and report generating. As seen in Figure 7,
administrators can assign five types of inspections: Initial, Routine, In-Depth, Damage, and
Special. The inspection status can be monitored from this inspection list, the types of which are
described in Table 2.
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Figure 7. Inspection Management on the administrator’s side
Inspection Status
Awaiting Approval
Awaiting Confirmation
Declined
In Progress
Rejected

Description
The inspection report submitted by the inspector is awaiting
final approval by the administrator.
The assigned inspection is awaiting schedule confirmation
from the inspector.
The inspector declined the assigned inspection.
Inspection is in progress by the inspector.
The inspection report submitted by the inspector was rejected
by the administrator.

Table 2: Inspection status types
Besides, administrators can review inspection reports, and approved inspections are archived.
Inspectors can view the list of inspections assigned by the administrator and those
approved. They can accept/reject the assigned inspections using the web application, which
enables communication with the administrator regarding inspections. After completing the on24

site inspection and data collection, the inspector can start generating an inspection report using
the web interface, as shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Inspection Management on the inspector’s side
The report generating interface implemented based on the actual WV bridge inspection
report analysis consists of three sections: Narrative Summary, Inspection Findings of Bridge
Elements, and Additional Documents. Figure 9 shows the instructions for creating the report. As
the first step in generating a report, the inspector writes narrative summaries. The person in
charge describes the inspection procedure, inspection summary, comments, traffic conditions,
etc., and can attach pictures for each individual narrative item.
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Figure 9. Instructions for generating a bridge inspection report
Second, describing the inspection findings of bridge elements is a major part of
generating a report. The inspector can use the memory device or database server in which the
information collected in the field investigation stage is stored through the data collection module.
As shown in Figure 10, each picture can be mapped to bridge elements in the 3D model based on
GPS information. When each dot representing bridge elements is clicked, the basic information
of the component, as well as photos with its note written by inspectors. Pictures having the same
GPS information as the coordinate of each element are automatically selected. Since every
bridge component also shows all sub-data of the image sets selected by the user, it can be added
or excluded by the need of the official.
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(a) An overview of rating bridge elements

(b) Details of rating bridge elements
Figure 10. Inspection findings of bridge elements
This approach allows inspectors to choose the most suitable photos for inspection and edit notes
related to the element. Inspectors can rate the safety level on a scale of 1 to 9 based on criteria
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established by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and the classification of conditions
is shown in Figure 11 (U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration,
1995). Bridge elements marked with gray dots in the initial 3D model are displayed in different
colors (1 – 3: red, 4 – 6: yellow, 7 – 9: green) depending on their rating. This feature enables
intuitive analysis by visually displaying the condition of the bridge.

Figure 11. Condition Ratings (U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway
Administration, 1995)
As the last step of generating an inspection report, the inspector can use the file upload
function to add documents and then review the final contents of the report. The review page in
the web interface also provides the PDF version that will be generated, similar to the bridge
inspection report used by the state DoT. This preview function allows inspectors to obtain soft
and hard copies of the final report.
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Inspector management
Inspector Management provides a user interface for personnel management, such as
adding inspectors or revoking their privileges to the system. Administrators can create new
inspector accounts. Inspector information can be updated or deleted. This process allows new
inspectors to gain access to the system.
Report Management
Report Management contains visualization features and statistical functions for data
analysis. The supervisor can use the Yearly Inspection Report Tool to view the overall status of
the bridge inspections, including the number of inspections performed per year and the
categorized bridge list by the risk rate. The assessed risk level by year for the selected bridge can
be tracked and checked through the Longitudinal Analysis Tool.
The Yearly Inspection Report displays the number of inspections assigned and performed
in a particular year. Figure 12 shows the bridge inspection statistics by year displayed as a pie
chart. Supervisors can visually check how many bridges are classified by risk rate and clicking
on each risk label in the pie chart lists the bridges in that category. This list provides drill-down
functions. The web application provides a 3D model containing bridge elements marked dots of
different colors according to the condition rating and includes a report of the inspection in PDF
format. Supervisors can save it in digital format document or print this document.
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Figure 12. Report Management on the supervisor’s side – Yearly Inspection Report
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Figure 13. Report Management on the supervisor’s side – Longitudinal Analysis
Figure 13 shows the Longitudinal Analysis function. This feature contains a graph of the
risk trend of the bridge within the selected time frame. When a specific bridge is selected in this
graph, the system returns a list of inspections by year. This list contains 3D models with colorcoded risk of bridge elements and an inspection report for each year.

4.2 Mobile Application
To provide a smooth on-site inspection process, a mobile application compatible with the
portable device controlling the drone has been developed. The use of React Native, which can
also be used cross-platform, was considered. For this purpose, the Expo framework was used,
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and it allows JavaScript codebase. The user interface was implemented in JavaScript. Calls to the
PHP API were utilized to communicate with the web application’s server and database. This
mobile application can use the POST method to send images and information through the API to
the server filesystem and database.

(a) Login

(b) Select a picture

(c) Write an inspection note (d) Upload the data

Figure 14. Collecting Inspection Data using Mobile Application
Figure 14 describes the process of collecting inspection data using the mobile application
according to the task sequence. Inspectors access the system by entering their credentials and
assigned inspection ID. By introducing the traditional login function with sessions, user
authentication has been strengthened and the security of the system has been improved. An
authorized user takes a picture of a bridge using a UAV and then selects a picture stored in the
IoT device memory or takes a picture using the mobile interface. The inspector can load a photo
into the application and add its name with an associated description. Along with user-entered
information, pictures, including GPS and metadata such as date and time, can be stored in the
memory of the IoT device or uploaded to a remote data server. The stored data transmitted to the
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remote server can be accessed by web applications, which can be used to generate inspection
reports.

4.3 Simulation of PUF-based Mutual Authentication Algorithm
A mutual authentication scheme has been implemented to ensure secure data
communication between the server and IoT devices. This thesis adopts the PUF-based algorithm
proposed by Aman et al. (2017). In this research, the server-side language is PHP, and the IoT
device uses JavaScript. Authentication messages are created and communicated using encryption
methods and computations compatible with each language. For encryption, the OpenSSL library
was used on the server-side, and the crypto-js library was used on the IoT side.
To simulate the PUF-based algorithm, several assumptions were made as follows.
1) A custom function is used to generate a response using a challenge and PUF.
2) A random 32-bit binary value was assigned as the PUF value.
3) Table 3 shows the notations for describing the algorithm.
Notation
𝐼𝐷𝐴
𝐼𝐷𝑆
𝑁0
𝑖
𝐶 , 𝐶 𝑖+1
𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖+1
𝑅𝑁, 𝑁𝐴
∥
{ }𝑅𝑖
𝑀𝐴 , 𝑀𝑆
𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐴 , 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑆
⨁
𝐹𝑃𝑈𝐹
ℎ( )

Description
Identifier of the IoT device
Identifier of the Server
32-bit initial nonce
Challenge at the 𝑖-th, (𝑖 + 1)th iteration
Response of the Challenge 𝐶 𝑖 , 𝐶 𝑖+1
32-bit random nonce
Concatenation operator
Encryption using key 𝑅𝑖
128-bit encrypted message for 𝐼𝐷𝐴 , 𝐼𝐷𝑆
Message authentication code for 𝐼𝐷𝐴 , 𝐼𝐷𝑆
Bitwise Exclusive OR (XOR) operator
A custom function using PUF
Hash function

Table 3: Notations for PUF-based mutual authentication algorithm
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The PUF-based light-weight mutual authentication algorithm simulated in this thesis is
summarized in Figure 15. This protocol consists of four steps.
1) The IoT device (𝐼𝐷𝐴 ) generates a nonce N0 in the traditional login process which uses
a password method and then sends this value to the server (𝐼𝐷𝑆 ) with the 𝐼𝐷𝐴 .
2) The server reads the 𝐶𝑅𝑃 (𝐶 𝑖 , 𝑅 𝑖 ) that they already know corresponding to the 𝐼𝐷𝐴 .
For the upcoming message generation step, a 32-bit random nonce 𝑅𝑁 is generated,
and 𝐼𝐷𝐴 , 𝑁0 , and 𝑅𝑁 are concatenated. This concatenated value is encrypted using the
response 𝑅𝑖 hashed using Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-256 as a key to generating an
encrypted message 𝑀𝐴 . For this, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-256 in Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) mode is used. Then, the message 𝑀𝐴 , the response 𝑅𝑖 , and the
nonce 𝑅𝑁 are concatenated to generate 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐴 , the code that authenticates the message.
The server sends the challenge 𝐶 𝑖 , the message 𝑀𝐴 , and the authentication code 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐴
to the IoT device.
3) The IoT device generates a response 𝑅𝑖 using the challenge 𝐶 𝑖 received from the
server and the unique fingerprint 𝑃𝑈𝐹. This paper applies a bitwise XOR of the 𝑃𝑈𝐹
to a challenge as a custom function for generating a response. For 𝑀𝐴𝐶 verification,
the response 𝑅𝑖 is converted into a hash value using SHA-256. The device
concatenates the message 𝑀𝐴 and its hashed response 𝑅 𝑖 , removing the part equal to
this value in the 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐴 . At this time, if 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐴 has the same value as before the removal
step, 𝑀𝐴𝐶 verification fails. This means that the response 𝑅 𝑖 of the server and the
response 𝑅𝑖 calculated by the IoT are different, so they have different 𝑃𝑈𝐹 values.
Since the remaining part is a random nonce 𝑅𝑁 generated by the server, the IoT device
obtains the nonce 𝑅𝑁 value after the successful removal process. Next, a 32-bit
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random nonce 𝑁𝐴 is generated, and this nonce 𝑁𝐴 and random nonce 𝑅𝑁 are
concatenated for the following step. This linked value creates a new challenge 𝐶 𝑖+1 by
SHA-256 hash. Using 𝐶 𝑖+1 and the 𝑃𝑈𝐹, a new response 𝑅 𝑖+1 is calculated. Then,
𝐼𝐷𝐴 , 𝑅𝑁, 𝑁𝐴 , and 𝑅 𝑖+1 are concatenated, and this value is encrypted using the SHA256 hashed response 𝑅𝑖 as a key to generate an encrypted message 𝑀𝑆 . For this, AES128 in CBC mode is used. The message 𝑀𝑆 , the response 𝑅𝑖 , and the nonce 𝑁𝐴 are
concatenated to generate 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑆 , a code that authenticates the message. Finally, the IoT
device sends the encrypted message 𝑀𝑆 and the authentication code 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑆 to the
server.
4) The server concatenates the message 𝑀𝑆 and the hashed response 𝑅𝑖 , removing the
part equal to this value in 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑆 . At this time, if 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑆 has the same value as before
the removal step, 𝑀𝐴𝐶 verification fails. This means that the response 𝑅𝑖 of the server
and the response 𝑅 𝑖 calculated by the IoT are different. They, therefore, have different
𝑃𝑈𝐹 values. Since the remaining part is a random nonce 𝑁𝐴 generated by the IoT
device, the server obtains a nonce 𝑁𝐴 value after the successful removal process. Next,
the message 𝑀𝑆 is decrypted by using AES-128 in CBC mode with the SHA-256
hashed response value 𝑅𝑖 as the key. If decryption is not performed successfully, it
means that the client has a different value for 𝑅𝑖 . Thus, authentication fails. The server
concatenates 𝐼𝐷𝐴 , 𝑅𝑁, and 𝑁𝐴 to remove the same part as this value from the decoded
𝑀𝑆 . If this removal is successful, the server gets a new response 𝑅𝑖+1 calculated by the
IoT device. The random nonce 𝑁𝐴 and the random nonce 𝑅𝑁 are concatenated for the
next step, and this linked value generates a new challenge 𝐶 𝑖+1 by hashing using SHA256. If all steps are successful, the server applies XOR to the random nonce 𝑅𝑁 and
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the random nonce 𝑁𝐴 respectively hashed with SHA-256 and then stores them in the
session.

Figure 15. Summary of the Simulated PUF-based Mutual Authentication Algorithm
This lightweight algorithm for mutual authentication ensures data integrity by using
encrypted messages and hashed values. It also enables device authentication. The server can
decide whether to trust the device based on whether it is authenticated or not. This scheme,
therefore, provides reliability for the data transmitted by the authenticated device. Since the
database only stores data transmitted by legitimate IoT devices, security issues caused by
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improper data insertion can be resolved. Furthermore, Aman et al. (2017), who proposed the
lightweight algorithm simulated in this system, provided a security analysis of this protocol using
Mao and Boyd logic (Mao & Boyd, 1993). This proved that the applied mutual authentication
algorithm is safe against all major security attacks, including spoofing, man-in-the-middle,
eavesdropping, etc (Aman et al., 2017).

4.4 Database
The database is designed to be accessible by web and mobile applications. Through the
requirements analysis, relations between entities and properties have been defined. MySQL
Workbench was used to design the relational database, resulting in an Entity Relationship
Diagram (ERD). Figure 16 shows the designed database, and more detailed information can be
found in Appendix C. The stored procedure approach is adopted for query security. The
generated physical schema has migrated to the server.
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Figure 16. Entity relationship diagram of the implemented database
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The database consists of twenty-four tables. Among these, notable tables are Inspections,
Bridges, and Bridge Elements. The ‘inspections’ table contains several basic information about
the inspection, and the primary key is inspectionID, which is automatically incremented.
BridgeNo, InspectionTypeNo, AdminID, InspectorID, and EvaluatorID are foreign keys, forming
a relationship with other tables. BridgeNo cannot be null. The ‘bridges’ table contains basic
information about bridges, and the primary key is BridgeNo. CountyNo and BridgeModelNo are
foreign keys, and BARsNo, a unique bridge management number, cannot have duplicate values.
The ‘bridge elements’ table contains overall data about bridge elements, and the primary key is
ElementID. BridgeNo and InspectionTypeNo make each row unique and are foreign keys.
ClassNo, CategoryNo, MaterialNo, DetailElementNo, which are element’s information, are also
foreign keys and are linked to each table. These foreign key values cannot be null. The current
database schema was designed based on an analysis of the National Bridge Inspection Standards
(NBIS). It is, thus, capable of defining inspection for various types of bridges that are currently
in use in the United States.
This database is designed to reduce redundancy data between tables through
normalization. In the first normalization process, each column is defined to have only one value.
For example, one inspector can create multiple inspections. If data is organized depending on
users, one row should own multiple columns. To prevent this, the inspection table applied a
method to have different rows based on a unique inspection ID rather than for each inspection
user, and this made every column have only one column value. In the same vein, a bridge has
multiple bridge elements. If the bridge element table is grouped by bridge ID, multiple values
can belong to one column. With this in mind, the devised database is placed in different rows in
the bridge element table, even if the same bridge identification number.
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The proposed database does not use more than one primary key for each table. This
satisfies a fully functional dependency on all columns. Finally, transition dependency was
eliminated. An inspection, for instance, requires not only a user’s unique ID to identify who is in
charge but also details such as the roles of the users. Instead of listing each user’s details in the
inspector table, by separating the user table from the user role table, the Third Normal Form
(3NF) is satisfied. As a result, the data redundancy was reduced through the third normalization
process.
A variety of data is used in the bridge inspection report. The actual bridge inspection
report was analyzed, and the information was divided into structured data and unstructured data.
For structured data, a generally accepted length was applied in consideration of the format. An
example of unstructured data is the description that each item in the narrative report contains.
Because the length of them was not regulated by the transportation department. For these
unstructured data, the proposed database uses the LONGTEXT type to accept input up to 2 32
characters (ORACLE, 2022).

4.5 3D Modeling of Bridge
In the previous study in this thesis, iBIRD (Song et al., 2022), field tests were performed
in compliance with federal and state regulations and laws to generate an initial 3D model of the
bridge. The target bridge was photographed by flying a UAV. The shooting was repeated several
times to improve data quality. The visual data obtained in this method were extracted as images
through frame division, and pictures were selected so as not to exceed the maximum processing
number of 120. Each image contained more than 85% connected shapes and it is an important
factor in improving the accuracy of the 3D model. This selected series of pictures were converted
to an object file via ODM in a docker environment. The object file and texture files generated as
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a result of this modeling process were integrated using MeshLab, and the 3D model of the bridge
was improved by removing unnecessary areas.
This thesis added an advanced retouching through Blender and conversion to glb format
while maintaining the overall framework of 3D modeling proposed by iBIRD (Song et al., 2022).
Previous research used Three.js to provide a 3D model manipulation function, which made the
program heavy and slow. To improve this issue, an API, <model-viewer>, was adopted in this
research. This approach significantly reduced the number of lines of code and remarkably
shortened the web loading time. These improvements have the advantage of making it possible
to create more sophisticated bridge models but also providing easy maintenance. Furthermore, it
was shown that even when using 3D models obtained from external sources, they can be applied
to the system through a simple format conversion process. It proves the scalability of the
proposed schema.

(a) Picture of actual bridge

(b) Model created by ODM

Figure 17. The 3D modeling process of the bridge
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(c) Refined Model by MeshLab

CHAPTER 5: SECURITY AND THREAT ANALYSIS
It is necessary to clarify exactly what is meant by “trust.” Throughout this thesis, the term
“trust” refers to the state in which users believe that the platform is safe for data communication
by ensuring that information requiring a certain level of security, such as bridge inspection data,
is not leaked or tampered with by unauthorized entities. In other words, a trusted platform means
having an appropriate security medium to prevent information leakage and tampering by
malicious subjects. It is an important part to set the level of cybersecurity for the implementation
of a trusted platform. Various entities are involved in the bridge inspection system using UAVs
and the threat factor is different for each entity. These threats may have different security levels
or security baselines that can be applied to each subject.
The proposed schema has adopted the ZT architecture for threat analysis and security
baseline setting. According to the definition of the National Security Agency (NSA, 2021), the
ZT model is a security schema designed based on the assumption that threats exist without
distinction between inside and outside the network. In other words, the model is based on the
principle that threats can arise anywhere in a conventional network. This security model
improves the security of data and systems by removing implicit trusts within the network and
continuously verifying them. In the same vein, the Department of Defense (DOD) argues that a
classic security strategy divided into multiple layers is ineffective against resource-rich intruders
and proposes a ZT strategy to counter persistent cyber threats (Joint DISA/NSA Zero Trust
Engineering Team, 2021). In line with these latest trends, this proposed schema assumes all
entities as untrusted objects and analyzes the threats to each entity in terms of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (CIA) required in cybersecurity. The threats mentioned in this chapter
can change according to the business environment, and the built-in security methods according to
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the analyzed threats can be replaced in the future depending on the change in the situation or to
provide better stability.

5.1 User Security
Human resources accessing the system can be a major security threat. If unauthorized
users access the system, there is a risk of tampering with the information or using it with
malicious intentions. In other words, the confidentiality of data may not be maintained due to
access by users with bad intentions. The proposed system handles bridge information and bridge
inspection data. Basic bridge information, such as the bridge’s name and location, is open to the
public, but inspection data can be sensitive information as it describes the bridge’s weaknesses.
If confidentiality is not maintained, these vulnerabilities can be exploited by terrorists, which can
lead to infrastructure collapse. In addition, access by users with malicious intentions can be a
threat to integrity and availability. If the bridge data is changed without permission, it may
provide incorrect inspection results for the bridge. This may affect the budget distribution and
cause economic damage but also measures may not be taken in a timely manner for bridges in
which actual danger is found due to incorrect inspection information. This can compromise
integrity and availability.
In summary, due to the characteristic of bridge inspections that identify vulnerabilities in
critical infrastructure, information leakage and manipulation can be serious problems. In view of
this issue, the proposed platform subdivides the roles of users according to their tasks and
controls access by granting the least privileges according to the roles. Depending on the
authority, the scope of access to the system and the functions that can be used are limited, and
this is strictly managed through authentication.
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In this platform, authorized workers assumed that credentials were registered in the
system in the pre-registration stage by the system administrator. The workers must be authorized
officials in accordance with the transportation department’s internal policy. For example,
supervisor privilege is given to the department’s chair, and administrator privileges allow access
to the person who oversees inspections. Inspector authorities are limited to those who direct
actual field work and generate reports. UAV pilots should be department officials with drone
pilot certificates issued by the FAA.
For human entities to access the system, they are required to authenticate with a
password. The password is encrypted and sent to the server and is stored as a SHA1 hash value,
40 hexadecimal digits long, in the database. The current hash function for passwords can be
improved to make password guessing more difficult by adding a salt, an arbitrary string. The real
accounts other than demonstration accounts use a password of at least 15 characters in length,
and this password is considered a complex string containing both uppercase and lowercase letters
and numbers. For better security in the future, user authentication can be strengthened by
introducing Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) authentication using email, text messages, and
one-time passwords (OTP). Alternatively, it can be extended to a state authentication system, and
a commercial authentication system provided by technology-leading companies can be
introduced.
Verification of legitimate users also lowers the probability of system changes by
unauthorized users. Consequently, the appropriate access control and least privilege principles
applied to this scheme ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
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5.2 Hardware Security
Various hardware is involved in the bridge inspection scheme. This hardware includes
client devices such as IoT devices and desktops and UAVs. The factors that make it difficult for
hardware to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability are theft, use of unauthorized
devices, or physical damage. For instance, the theft of an IoT device can result in the leakage of
key inspection information, such as inspection notes temporarily stored on the machine. This can
be a reason that makes it difficult to maintain confidentiality. In addition, if the bridge
management system can be accessed through the use of unauthorized devices, unpredictable user
behavior like data injection can pose a threat to the system. This can affect data integrity. Loss or
breakage of UAVs and IoT devices can make it difficult to collect bridge inspection data and
therefore not guarantee availability.
Considering these issues, countermeasures against physical threats and authentication for
legitimate devices were considered when designing the proposed platform. First, it is assumed
that the organization has established a set of policies for device management. All hardware in the
proposed framework is assumed to be work devices. The devices that are monitored and
managed by state officials are only used, and this means the use of secure hardware specified in
accordance with the department’s internal security regulations. UAVs and IoT devices should be
stored in a secure location to prevent theft, except when used in the field. The office where the
desktop is installed may be a space that has closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs) and uses a
security access key to limit user access. To prevent further security threats, it is assumed that
only approved software can be installed on all hardware and that the devices are using the latest
security patches. IoT and desktop devices should be set to lock the screen after a certain amount
of time. Moreover, the hardware can be checked to ensure normal operation on a regular basis. In
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the future, full-disk encryption may also be considered. As a non-repudiation feature, access
control can be added by logging device lists and access to devices.
Next, the proposed framework performs device authentication for IoT devices through
the adoption of PUF-based algorithms. This algorithm implements mutual authentication of two
entities by exchanging encrypted messages between an IoT device and a remote server and
checking the suitability of the values. Messages and authentication code values used in this
process are changed into ciphertext through hash function or encryption method and then
communicated. This communication mechanism is also effective against man-in-the-middle
attacks. It gives integrity to the system and provides authentication that verifies the entitlement
of entities to access information, as well as includes non-repudiation capabilities.
Being prepared for physical threats and introducing user authentication mediums for
legitimate devices ensures confidentiality and integrity and provides availability. The proposed
system ensures authorization by giving permission to legitimate devices, verifies the conformity
of the entities by introducing an authentication process, and has the accounting property by
adopting access control over access history. The platform, thus, meets the authentication,
authorization, and accounting security framework.

5.3 Software Security
In this thesis, the software includes intangible assets such as servers, implemented web
and mobile applications, and databases. The factors that make it difficult for software to ensure
confidentiality, integrity, and availability include the use of untrusted software and the lack of
encryption policies for sensitive data. If untrusted software is used, input by inspectors or
administrators can be intercepted, which can create confidentiality issues. If encryption for
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sensitive data is not in place, internal data can be leaked or easily changed by external objects.
This affects confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The web application of the proposed platform was hosted on a remote server.
Considering this environment, it is assumed that access to the web application is accessed
through a URL using the HTTPS method. In the future, the implementation of an internal server
in the business unit can improve the reliability of the platform by making it accessible only from
the intranet. In the case of the mobile application, a system manager directly installs the program
on the device during the deployment stage to ensure safety. The system manager is an official
who oversees the system in the department and is assumed to be a trusted person who has the
original application installation files.
The database designed for this framework stores sensitive information such as passwords
as hash values. This is a secure tool that minimizes damage by making it difficult to infer the
plaintext even if the database is leaked. The use of hash functions provides confidentiality to the
system. As an extension of the database, a stored procedure method is used in which Structured
Query Language (SQL) is defined on the server. This hides the textual format query from the
program code, making inference highly complex. It, therefore, prevents SQL injection attacks
that can occur on the client-side or activities that manipulate SQL by analyzing code. That is, it
not only ensures integrity by preventing the database from being changed by unauthorized users
but also improves the security of the overall database. Besides, the proposed framework assumes
regular backups of the database. This prevents data loss due to security breaches, allowing data
to be provided in a timely manner for users. This ensures the availability of data. In addition, the
mobile application proposed a method of storing the collected inspection data by transmitting it
to a remote server in the field inspection stage. This prevents the loss of data availability due to
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the loss or theft of the inspector’s physical tools, which has been an issue in the traditional bridge
inspection.
Providing legitimate software and including encryption functions and backup policies in
the database maintains confidentiality, ensures integrity, and provides availability. In this
chapter, the threat and security analysis of the proposed schema were presented in terms of user,
hardware, and software. To build a trusted platform, the threats to each entity constituting the
system were analyzed, and then the proposed system’s security baseline and security methods
were presented to counter the potential threats.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
The fundamental goal of this research was to identify the issues of traditional bridge
inspection and to devise a cost-effective and trusty bridge inspection schema that can replace the
current method. To this end, visual inspection reports and bridge inspection manuals from
federal, state, and local transportation agencies were analyzed. Based on this, Trusted-BIMS, a
trusted bridge inspection framework using UAV, was proposed, and a web framework, a mobile
application, and a lightweight authentication algorithm have been implemented to prove this new
concept.
The most obvious finding from this study is that the proposed schema reduces inspection
costs and decreases the likelihood of potential safety accidents for inspectors. Using drones can
reduce equipment rental costs caused by the use of ladders, special inspection vehicles, etc., and
can also decrease traffic control costs due to shorter working hours can be reduced. Allowing
drones to be used in places where human access is difficult can significantly reduce the work of
inspectors at height. This enables inspectors to work more safely. Furthermore, this framework
provides intuitive data analysis through the function to manage bridge information including 3D
models of bridges and helps to create efficient and easy reports using the collected inspection
data. The proposed scheme also provides a platform for sharing data among different parties with
an interest, increasing the objectivity of data and allowing connectivity between data. This makes
it possible to accumulate big data about bridges. These findings broadly support other research
work in this field linking bridge inspections and UAVs.
Another important finding was that the proposed platform improved security compared to
the previous research on prototype development. The prototypes have not treated security in
much detail, such as not including hashes for passwords. However, the proposed schema is
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designed by applying the ZT strategy. Threats to each entity were analyzed from the point of
view of the CIA, which is the core of security, and appropriate security mediums were applied to
the proposed system. A notable improvement is the introduction of the PUF-based algorithm.
The algorithm simulated in this framework generates authentication values using only the
information that the two objects participating in authentication each know and the values they
have produced themselves. The generated values are hashed, and the result is used as the key to
encrypt the authentication messages. Even if the message is intercepted during communication,
an external intrusion object cannot verify the message. Since this mutual authentication protocol
can defend against major cybersecurity attacks including man-in-the-middle attacks, the
application of this secure algorithm improved the reliability and safety of the proposed platform.
This research is meaningful in that it proposes a bridge inspection process using UAV
and furthermore introduces a 3D bridge model into the inspection web framework. The 3D
model is linked with the collected data to enable bridge quality control and facilitate continuous
data capture. 3D modeling techniques using UAVs have been proposed, but based on our
information, this research is the first approach to introduce a system that integrates a modeling
technique with the function of generating bridge inspection reports.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
Bridge inspections are vital to maintaining the safety of the critical infrastructures that
support society. The inspections in West Virginia are performed using visual inspection methods
and this traditional approach has cost, safety, and quality issues. Modern UAV technology has
given rise to the suggestion that might replace traditional inspection techniques. The objective of
this study was to design and implement a reliable platform for Trusted-BIMS replacing current
expensive and unsafe manual inspection. The new approach proposed is an interactive bridge
inspection schema with built-in security methods while integrating 3D modeling using UAVs
into the report generation process. Based on comprehensive research and requirement analysis, a
web framework was implemented to share data among various parties with an interest, a mobile
application was designed, and a PUF-based algorithm for mutual authentication was adopted.
The web system was implemented using PHP as the server-side language, and the mobile
application was designed based on React Native. Messages in the mutual authentication
algorithm are encrypted using JavaScript on the client-side and PHP on the server-side. MySQL
database was used for data management. The suggested procedure was tested in the field to
ensure its validity. Experimental results found that using 3D modeling in a UAV-based bridge
inspection system reduces the cost and worker safety issues. It also enables the efficient creation
and management of inspection reports along with detailed data. It was possible to visually check
the overall condition of the bridge through the operation of the 3D models. In addition, the
application of security mediums based on threat analysis and device authentication through
secure algorithms improved the overall security of the proposed platform. These results broadly
support other research work on the UAV-assisted bridge inspection process and the
implementation of secure software.
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The structural features of the drone used in this research limited imaging under the
bridge. There is a possibility that some GPS information will be lost in the process of image
extraction from video. In the future, it is recommended to carry out under the traffic control
condition when the inspector takes photos of the bottom parts of the bridge. More accurate GPS
mapping is suggested when using a moving picture to create 3D models. For the refined
implementation of device authentication, research can be carried out on methods to communicate
with actual PUF values. Cybersecurity issues may arise for UAVs and various IoT devices
involved in the bridge inspection process. It is, therefore, a future research work to investigate
more extensive security vulnerabilities and to establish a more comprehensive security scheme.
Besides, research on ways to minimize human participation can be proposed. Automatic crack
detection can be included in web applications to ensure that data inspection does not require
human activity.
In conclusion, this study presented a trusted bridge inspection framework using UAVs.
This includes the overall UAV-based bridge inspection process but also a web platform, mobile
interface, and mutual authentication using PUF value. It is meaningful in that it creates a 3D
model using a UAV and links it with web framework, a bridge inspection reporting module. The
findings of this research are expected to be of value to various parties with the same interest in
conducting bridge inspections.
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CHAPTER 8: FUTURE RESEARCH
Future research can be divided into short-term and long-term improvement. The first
short-term improvement is the implementation of a more sophisticated PUF algorithm based on
field testing. In this thesis, the PUF value of the IoT device was assigned as an arbitrable number
to simulate the security algorithm. Research on the communication method for the actual PUF
value included in the System-on-a-Chip (SoC) may be conducted for the implementation of a
more complete security algorithm. Second, cybersecurity issues of UAVs and IoT devices are
constantly being raised. Future research may suggest identifying more in-depth security
vulnerabilities and designing additional security schemes. Examples include MFA and a strong
password policy with force reset functions. Third, research on various methods to generate more
accurate bridge models is considered. One of the limitations found in the initial field testing for
collecting 3D bridge data was the limited imaging under the bridge. This is related to the angle of
view issue of the UAV used in the testing. The camera of the drone used was only located in the
front part and did not exist above the machine. These structural features made it difficult for the
drone to photograph the top of the UAV as it passed under the bridge. Future researchers could
address this issue by using machines with a 360-degree field of view or developing customized
UAVs. Another limitation was that the field testing conducted without traffic control created
constraints in photographing the target bridge due to manned vehicles. This can be improved by
performing traffic control during the flight of the drone. Furthermore, there is a possibility that
GPS information will be lost in the process of extracting the video into images. This is a factor
that lowers the GPS mapping accuracy of the 3D model and the actual captured image. A
proposal for a more accurate GPS mapping system is required.
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In long-term improvement, research on security responses to unusual access/behavior
based on physical location detection using machine learning can be suggested. The research can
be extended to implement a more secure schema by improving the safety of the entities involved
in the inspection process, and various security technologies can be utilized more widely in the
process. Moreover, further studies can be conducted on how to minimize human involvement
throughout the bridge inspection process. Research on an automatic crack detecting system using
artificial intelligence to decrease human activity is one example. This can be a way to increase
the overall efficiency of a bridge inspection.
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APPENDIX A: APPROVAL LETTER
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APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS
3NF

Third Normal Form

AES
BARS
CBC
CCTVs

Advanced Encryption Standard
Bridge Analysis and Rating Systems
Cipher Block Chaining
Closed-Circuit Televisions

CFR
CISA
CNSS
COA
DHS

Code of Federal Regulations
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Committee on National Security Systems
Certificate of Authorization
Department of Homeland Security

DISA
DOD
ERD
FAA

Defense Information Systems Agency
Department of Defense
Entity Relationship Diagram
Federal Aviation Administration

iBIRD
IoT
MDOT
MFA

interactive Bridge Inspection Research using Drone
Internet of Thing
Michigan Department of Transportation
Multi-Factor Authentication

NBIS
NSA
OTP
PennDOT
PUF

National Bridge Inspection Standards
National Security Agency
One-Time Passwords
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
Physical Unclonable Function

SHA
SoC
SQL
Trusted-BIMS

Secure Hash Algorithm
System-on-a-Chip
Structured Query Language
Trusted Platform for Bridge Inspection Management System

TRUST
UAV
ZT

The Recreational UAS Safety Test
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Zero-Trust
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APPENDIX C: DATABASE AND STORED PROCEDURES
Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD)
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Stored Procedure
A stored procedure is a method that stores a series of Structured Query Language (SQL)
in the database server in advance and executes a query by a call from a client. In this way, data
integrity can be ensured by making it difficult to guess, infer, or manipulate the query statement
on the client-side. It can also be used by multiple programs connected to the database via a
simple call, allowing code reuse.
Considering these advantages, the proposed schema adopts stored procedures. The figure
below is one example of the applied stored procedures. This procedure is used to get bridge
elements for an inspection, and this was tested on a local machine.

Figure 1. Stored Procedure: Server-side
The name of this procedure is ‘inspector_selectBridgeElementInspections’. This is used
to obtain data on the bridge elements required for each inspection. This procedure receives the
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inspection ID as a parameter and returns data about the bridge elements included in the
inspection. This query is stored on the database server.

Figure 2. Stored Procedure: Client-side
The client calls using the procedure name with a parameter. Because only the procedure’s
name is shown on the client-side, not the entire query, this simplifies the program code and
makes it difficult for malicious users to guess or manipulate the query. As such, the proposed
schema maintains data integrity through the use of stored procedures.
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